Secrecy Rates in the Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages and
  External Eavesdroppers by Geraci, Giovanni et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
30
6.
21
01
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
10
 Ju
n 2
01
3
Secrecy Rates in the Broadcast Channel with
Confidential Messages and External Eavesdroppers
Giovanni Geraci1,2, Sarabjot Singh3, Jeffrey G. Andrews3, Jinhong Yuan1, and Iain B. Collings2
1School of Electrical Engineering & Telecommunications, The University of New South Wales, AUSTRALIA
2Wireless and Networking Technologies Laboratory, CSIRO ICT Centre, Sydney, AUSTRALIA
3Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, USA
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers
(BCCE), where a multi-antenna base station simultaneously communicates to multiple potentially malicious
users, in the presence of randomly located external eavesdroppers. Using the proposed model, we study the
secrecy rates achievable by regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding by performing a large-system analysis
that combines tools from stochastic geometry and random matrix theory. We obtain explicit expressions for the
probability of secrecy outage and an upper bound on the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers.
We show that both these quantities scale as λe√
N
, where N is the number of transmit antennas and λe is the
density of external eavesdroppers, irrespective of their collusion strategy. Furthermore, we derive a practical
rule for the choice of the regularization parameter, which is agnostic of channel state information and location
of eavesdroppers, and yet provides close to optimal performance.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, broadcast channel, linear precoding, stochastic geometry, random matrix theory.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Multiuser multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless techniques have received tremendous
attention as a way to achieve high spectral efficiency in current mobile communication systems such as
Long Term Evolution (LTE) [1]. Due to the broadcast nature of the physical medium, wireless multiuser
communications are very susceptible to eavesdropping, and it is critical to secure the transmitted
information. Security has traditionally been achieved at the network layer with cryptographic schemes.
However, classical cryptography might not be suitable in large dynamic networks, since it requires
key distribution and management, and complex encryption/decryption algorithms [2], [3]. A method
that exploits the characteristics of wireless channels, such as fading and noise, was proposed as an
alternative to achieve perfect secrecy without requiring encryption keys [4]–[7]. This technique is
known as physical layer security, and it has recently become a very active area of research.
A. Motivation and Related Work
The underlying channel for multiuser MIMO wireless communications is referred to as the MIMO
broadcast channel (BC), where a central base station (BS) with N antennas simultaneously commu-
nicates to K users over the same frequency band. While it is known that dirty-paper coding (DPC)
is a capacity achieving precoding strategy for the Gaussian MIMO BC [8], the non-linearity of the
DPC precoder makes it too complex to be implemented [9], [10]. Linear strategies like regularized
channel inversion (RCI) precoding were proposed as a low-complexity alternative for practical systems
[11]–[13], and their performance was studied by a large-system approach that employs random matrix
theory (RMT) tools [14], [15].
Physical layer security was considered to protect the confidentiality of data in the BC, by introducing
the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC), where the users can act maliciously as
eavesdroppers [16]–[19]. A large-system analysis of the secrecy rates achievable by RCI precoding
in the BCC was performed by using RMT tools in [20]–[22], where eavesdropping was assumed
3from the malicious users only. The presence of external eavesdroppers and its effect on the secure
connectivity in random wireless networks were studied, among others, in [23]–[26] by employing
stochastic geometry (SG) tools, but the system model did not account for the potentially malicious
behavior of the users.
In a practical scenario, both malicious users and external nodes can act as eavesdroppers. A physical
layer security system designed by considering either one of them should be regarded as vulnerable. In
fact, a system designed by only considering the presence of external eavesdroppers would be vulnerable
to the potential malicious behavior of the users. On the other hand, considering the malicious users
only would make the system vulnerable to secrecy outage caused by eavesdropping nodes external to
the network. For these reasons, it is of critical importance to study broadcast channels with confidential
messages and external eavesdroppers.
B. Approach and Contributions
In this paper, we introduce the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdrop-
pers (BCCE) to model a scenario where both (i) malicious users, and (ii) randomly located external
nodes can act as eavesdroppers. This is a practical scenario that has not yet been addressed. We
study the performance of RCI precoding in the BCCE by performing a large-system analysis that
uses results from both SG and RMT. Stochastic geometry is a powerful tool to study a large network
with a random distribution of external eavesdroppers [27], whereas random matrix theory enables a
deterministic abstraction of the physical layer, for a fixed network topology [28]. By combining SG
and RMT, we can provide explicit expressions for the average large-system performance with respect
to the spatial distribution of the nodes and to the fluctuations of their channels. Our main contributions
are summarized below.
• We obtain the large-system probability of secrecy outage for the RCI precoder in the BCCE,
for the two cases of non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. We find that the large-system
4probability of secrecy outage scales as λe√
N
, where N is the number of transmit antennas and λe
is the density of external eavesdroppers, irrespective of their collusion strategy.
• We derive the large-system mean secrecy rate achievable by the RCI precoder in the BCCE. By
comparing the mean secrecy rate to the secrecy rate achievable in the BCC, we obtain an upper
bound on the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, which also scales as λe√
N
.
• We propose a rule for the choice of the regularization parameter ξ of the precoder that maximizes
the mean large-system secrecy rate. The function of ξ is to achieve a tradeoff between the signal
power at the legitimate user and the crosstalk at the malicious users. The proposed choice of ξ
is practical, since it does not require knowledge of either the fluctuations of the channels or the
spatial locations of the eavesdroppers, and it provides close to optimal performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the broadcast channel with
confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BBCE) and the secrecy rates achievable by RCI
precoding. In Section III, we derive the probability of secrecy outage, for both cases of non-colluding
and colluding external eavesdroppers. In Section IV, we derive the mean secrecy rates achievable by
RCI precoding in the BCCE, we study the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, and
we propose a practical rule for the choice of the regularization parameter of the precoder. In Section V,
we provide several numerical results that confirm the accuracy of the analysis. The paper is concluded
in Section VI and future work is suggested.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first recall some results on the MISO BCC, where malicious users connected to the
network can act as eavedroppers. Then we introduce the MISO BCCE, where not only malicious users
but also nodes external to the network can act as eavesdroppers. This is the case in a real system,
where external nodes are randomly scattered in space. These nodes must be regarded as potential
eavesdroppers, otherwise the system would be vulnerable to secrecy outage. The BCCE therefore
5represents a practical scenario that needs to be addressed.
A. Preliminaries: Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages (BCC)
We first consider the downlink of a narrowband MISO BCC, consisting of a base station with N
antennas which simultaneously transmits K independent confidential messages to K spatially dispersed
single-antenna users. In this model, transmission takes place over a block fading channel, and the
transmitted signal is x = [x1, . . . , xN ]T ∈ CN×1. We assume homogeneous users, i.e., each user
experiences the same received signal power on average, thus the model assumes that their distances
from the transmitter are the same and unitary. The received signal at user k is given by
yk =
N∑
j=1
hk,jxj + nk (1)
where hk,j ∼ CN (0, 1) is the i.i.d. channel between the j th transmit antenna element and the kth user,
and nk ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the noise seen at the kth receiver. The corresponding vector equation is
y = Hx+ n (2)
where H = [h1, . . . ,hK ]† is the K × N channel matrix. We assume E[nn†] = σ2IK , where IK is
the K × K identity matrix, define the SNR ρ , 1/σ2, and impose the long-term power constraint
E[‖x‖2] = 1. For each user k, we denote by Mk = {1, . . . , k − 1, k + 1, . . . , K} the set of remaining
users. In general, the behavior of the users cannot be determined by the BS. As a worst-case scenario,
we assume that for each user k, all users in Mk can cooperate to jointly eavesdrop on the kth message.
Since the set of malicious users Mk can perform joint processing, they can be seen as a single
equivalent malicious user Mk with K − 1 receive antennas.
In this paper, we consider regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding. In RCI precoding, the
transmitted vector x is obtained at the BS by performing a linear processing on the vector of confidential
messages u = [u1, . . . , uK ]T , whose entries are chosen independently, satisfying E[|uk|2] = 1. The
transmitted signal x after RCI precoding can be written as x = Wu, where W = [w1, . . . ,wK ] is the
6N ×K RCI precoding matrix, given by [12], [14], [15]
W =
1√
ζ
H†
(
HH† +NξIK
)−1
=
1√
ζ
(
H†H+NξIN
)−1
H† (3)
and ζ = tr
{
H†H
(
H†H+NξIN
)−2} is a long-term power normalization constant. The function of
the real regularization parameter ξ is to achieve a tradeoff between the signal power at the legitimate
user and the interference and information leakage at the other unintended users for each message.
Due to cooperation, interference cancellation can be performed at the equivalent malicious user Mk,
which does not see any undesired signal term apart from the received noise. As a result, a secrecy
rate achievable for user k by RCI precoding is given by [20]
RBCC,k =
[
log2
(
1 + γk
)
− log2
(
1 + γM,k
)]+
, (4)
where we use the notation [·]+ , max(·, 0), and where γk and γM,k are the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratios for the message uk at the legitimate receiver k and the equivalent malicious user Mk,
respectively, given by
γk =
ρ
∣∣∣h†kwk∣∣∣2
1 + ρ
∑
j 6=k
∣∣∣h†kwj∣∣∣2 and γM,k = ρ ‖Hkwk‖
2 , (5)
and where Hk is the matrix obtained from H by removing the kth row.
The secrecy rate of the RCI precoder in the large-system regime was studied in [21], where both
the number of receivers K and the number of transmit antennas N approach infinity, with their ratio
β = K/N being held constant. The value of β represents the network load. Let ρ > 0, β > 0, and let
RBCC,k be the secrecy rate achievable by RCI precoding in the BCC defined in (4). Then [21]
|RBCC,k −R◦BCC| a.s.−→ 0, as N →∞, ∀k (6)
where R◦BCC denotes the secrecy rate in the large-system regime, given by
R◦BCC =
[
log2
1 + γ◦
1 + γ◦M
]+
, (7)
7and where
γ◦ = g (β, ξ)
ρ+ ρξ
β
[1 + g (β, ξ)]2
ρ+ [1 + g (β, ξ)]2
and γ◦M =
ρ
[1 + g (β, ξ)]2
, (8)
with g (β, ξ) = 1
2
[√
(1−β)2
ξ2
+ 2(1+β)
ξ
+ 1 + 1−β
ξ
− 1
]
. The optimal value of ξ that maximizes the large-
system secrecy rate R◦BCC was obtained in [21] and it is given by
ξ◦BCC =
−2ρ2 (1− β)2 + 6ρβ + 2β2 − 2 [β (ρ+ 1)− ρ] ·√β2 [ρ2 + ρ+ 1]− β [2ρ (ρ− 1)] + ρ2
6ρ2 (β + 2) + 6ρβ
. (9)
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages and External Eavesdroppers (BCCE)
We now consider the MISO BCCE, by including external single-antenna eavesdroppers in the system.
The external eavesdroppers are assumed to be distributed on the two-dimensional plane according to
a Poisson point process (PPP) Φe of density λe [27]. Fig. 1 shows an example of BCCE, where the
BS is at the origin, and the users lie on a disc of radius 1. As a worst-case scenario, we assume that
each eavesdropper can cancel the interference caused by the remaining K − 1 messages. Assuming
that the BS lies at the origin, the SINR γe,k for the kth message at a generic eavesdropper located in
e is then given by
γe,k =
∣∣h†ewk∣∣2
‖e‖ησ2 (10)
where h†e is the channel vector between the base station and the eavesdropper in e, and it takes into
account the Rayleigh fading, and η is the path loss exponent. Some of the results provided in this
paper assume a path loss exponent η = 4. In this special case, which is a reasonable value for η in a
shadowed urban area [29], it is possible to obtain compact expressions for quantities of interest, such
as the probability of secrecy outage and the mean secrecy rate.
The precoding vector wk is calculated independently of h†e, therefore they are independent isotropic
random vectors. The channel h†e has unit norm, whereas the precoding vector wk has norm 1√K because
it is obtained after the normalization ‖W‖2 =∑Kk=1 ‖wk‖2 = 1. The inner product h†ewk is a linear
combination of N complex normal random variables, therefore
∣∣h†ewk∣∣2 ∼ exp( 1K ).
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Fig. 1. Example of a BCCE with K = 5 malicious users and a density of external eavesdroppers λe = 0.2.
In the following, we consider two types of external eavesdroppers, namely non-colluding eavesdrop-
pers and colluding eavesdroppers. In the non-colluding case, the eavesdroppers individually overhear
the communication without centralized processing. In the colluding eavesdroppers case, all eavesdrop-
pers are able to jointly process their received message at a central data processing unit. The secrecy
rate Rk achievable by the kth user in the BCCE is given by
Rk =
[
log2
(
1 + γk
)
− log2
(
1 + max (γM,k, γE,k)
)]+
, (11)
where γE,k is the resulting SINR of the PPP of external eavesdoppers for the kth message. The secrecy
rate Rk is therefore affected by the maximum of the SINR γM,k at the alliance of malicious users
and the SINR γE,k at the external eavesdroppers. In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, γE,k
is the SINR at the strongest eavesdropper. In the case of colluding eavesdroppers, all eavesdroppers
can perform joint processing, and they can, therefore, be seen as a single multi-antenna eavesdropper.
After interference cancellation, each eavesdropper receives the useful signal embedded in noise, and
the optimal receive strategy at the colluding eavesdroppers is maximal ratio combining (MRC) which
9yields to an SINR γE,k =
∑
e∈Φe γe,k given by the sum of the SINRs γe,k at all eavesdroppers.
The achievable secrecy sum-rate is denoted by S and defined as S =
∑K
k=1Rk.
III. PROBABILITY OF SECRECY OUTAGE
In this section, we derive the secrecy outage probability, i.e., the probability that the secrecy rate Rk
achievable by user k with RCI precoding in the BCCE is zero, for both cases of non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers. Then we study the secrecy outage probability in the large-system regime,
and determine how the number of antennas N must scale in order to guarantee a given secrecy outage
probability. The secrecy outage probability for user k is defined as
Ok , P(Rk = 0) =


1 if γk ≤ γM,k
P(γE,k ≥ γk | γk) otherwise
(12)
In most cases, RCI precoding ensures γk > γM,k [21], and therefore, the secrecy outage probability is
often given by the probability that Rk is driven to zero by the presence of external eavesdroppers.
A. Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, γE,k is the SINR at the strongest eavesdropper E, given
by
γE,k = max
e∈Φe
γe,k = max
e∈Φe
∣∣h†ewk∣∣2
‖e‖ησ2 . (13)
In the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, Ok is the probability that any eavesdropper has an SINR
greater than or equal to the SINR of the legitimate user k. We obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. The secrecy outage probability for user k in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers
is given by
Ok =


1 if γk ≤ γM,k
1− exp
[
− 2πλeΓ(
2
η )
η(Nβσ2γk)
2
η
]
otherwise
(14)
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where Γ(·) is the gamma function defined as
Γ(z) ,
∫ ∞
0
tz−1e−tdt. (15)
Proof: See Appendix A.
By applying results from RMT [28], we now obtain the large-system secrecy outage probability O◦
in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers satisfies
|Ok −O◦| a.s.−→ 0, as N →∞, ∀k (16)
where
O◦ =


1 if γ◦ ≤ γ◦M
1− exp
[
− 2πλeΓ(
2
η )
η(Nβσ2γ◦)
2
η
]
otherwise
(17)
Proof: Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1, by noting that |γk − γ◦| a.s.−→ 0 as N → ∞, and by
the continuous mapping theorem [30].
Corollary 1. If γ◦ > γ◦M and η = 4, then (i) the number of transmit antennas required in order
to guarantee a large-system secrecy outage probability O◦ < ǫ in the presence of non-colluding
eavesdroppers is N >
(
µλe
ǫ
√
γ◦
)2
, where µ , π
3
2
2
√
βσ2
, and (ii) the large-system secrecy outage probability
O◦ decays as 1√
N
.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 1, by noting that Γ (1
2
)
=
√
π, and that 1− e−x > x for
0 < x < 1.
A special case of the previous scenario is the one where only the eavesdropper which is nearest to
the base station attempts to eavesdrop. In this case we have
γE,k =
∣∣∣h†Ewk∣∣∣2
‖E‖ησ2 (18)
where
E = argmin
e∈Φe
‖e‖. (19)
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Lemma 2. The secrecy outage probability for user k, caused by the external eavesdropper nearest to
the base station, under a path loss exponent η = 4, is given by
Ok =


1 if γk ≤ γM,k
2µλe√
Nγk
exp
(
µ2λ2e
πNγk
)
Q
(
µλe
√
2
πNγk
)
otherwise
(20)
where Q(·) is the Q-function defined as
Q(x) ,
1√
2π
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
−u
2
2
)
du. (21)
Proof: See Appendix B.
By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the large-system secrecy outage probabilityO◦ caused
by the eavesdropper which is nearest to the base station.
Theorem 2. The secrecy outage probability for user k, caused by the external eavesdropper nearest
to the base station, under a path loss exponent η = 4, satisfies
|Ok −O◦| a.s.−→ 0, as N →∞, ∀k (22)
where
O◦ =


1 if γ◦ ≤ γ◦M
µλe√
N
(
1 + µ
2λ2e
πN
)(
1− 2µλe
π
√
N
)
otherwise
(23)
Proof: Theorem 2 follows from Lemma 2, by first-order Taylor approximation of (20), by noting
that |γk − γ◦| a.s.−→ 0 as N →∞, and by the continuous mapping theorem [30].
B. Colluding Eavesdroppers
The colluding eavesdroppers case represents a worst-case scenario. In this case, all eavesdroppers
can perform joint processing, and they can therefore be seen as a single multi-antenna eavesdropper.
After interference cancellation, each eavesdropper receives the useful signal embedded in noise, and
the optimal receive strategy at the colluding eavesdroppers is maximal ratio combining (MRC). This
12
yields to an SINR γE,k at the colluding eavesdroppers given by
γE,k =
1
σ2
∑
e∈Φe
‖e‖−η ∣∣h†ewk∣∣2 . (24)
Lemma 3. The secrecy outage probability for user k in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, under
a path loss exponent η = 4, is given by
Ok =


1 if γk ≤ γM,k
1− 2Q
(
µλe
√
π
2Nγk
)
otherwise
(25)
Proof: See Appendix C.
By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the large-system secrecy outage probability O◦ in
the presence of colluding eavesdroppers.
Theorem 3. The secrecy outage probability in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, under a path
loss exponent η = 4, satisfies
|Ok −O◦| a.s.−→ 0, as N →∞, ∀k (26)
where
O◦ =


1 if γ◦ ≤ γ◦M
1− 2Q
(
µλe
√
π
2Nγ◦
)
otherwise
(27)
Proof: Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 3, by noting that Γ (1
2
)
=
√
π, that |γk − γ◦| a.s.−→ 0 as
N →∞, and by the continuous mapping theorem [30].
Corollary 2. Let γ◦ > γ◦M and η = 4, then (i) the number of transmit antennas required in order to
guarantee a large-system secrecy outage probabilityO◦ < ǫ in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers
is N >
(
µλe
ǫ
√
γ◦
)2
, and (ii) the large-system outage probability O◦ decays as 1√
N
.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 3 and by using 1− 2Q(x) <
√
2
π
x for 0 < x < 1.
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Remark 1. By comparing the results in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, we can conclude that (i)
the collusion among eavesdroppers does not significantly affect the number of transmit antennas N
required to meet a given probability of secrecy outage in the large-system regime, and (ii) increasing
the density of eavesdroppers λe by a factor n requires increasing N by a factor n2 in order to meet
a given probability of secrecy outage.
IV. MEAN SECRECY RATES
In this section, we derive the mean secrecy rates, averaged over the location of the external eaves-
droppers, achievable by RCI precoding in the BCCE, for both cases of non-colluding and colluding
eavesdroppers. We then study the mean secrecy rates in the large-system regime, and derive a bound
on the secrecy rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers. Finally, we propose a rule for
the choice of the regularization parameter of the precoder that maximizes the mean of the large-system
secrecy rate.
A. Mean Secrecy Rate
We now obtain the following result for the mean secrecy rate at user k.
Lemma 4. The mean secrecy rate achievable at user k by RCI precoding in the BCCE is given by
EΦe [Rk] =


0 if γk ≤ γM,k
log2
(1+γk)
1−Ok
(1+γM,k)
1−Pk
− ∫ γk
γM,k
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy otherwise
(28)
In (28), Pk is the probability that the SINR γE,k at the external eavesdroppers is greater than or equal
to the SINR γM,k at the malicious users, and for a path loss exponent η = 4 is given by
Pk , P(γE,k ≥ γM,k) =


1− exp
(
− µλe√
NγM,k
)
for non-colluding eavesdroppers
1− 2Q
(
µλe
√
π
2NγM,k
)
for colluding eavesdroppers
(29)
and fγE,k(y) is the distribution of the SINR at the external eavesdroppers, given by
fγE,k(y) =


µλey
−
3
2
2
√
N
exp
(
− µλe√
Ny
)
for non-colluding eavesdroppers
µλey
−
3
2
2
√
N
exp
(
−πµ2λ2e
4Ny
)
for colluding eavesdroppers
(30)
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Proof: See Appendix D.
By applying results from RMT, we now obtain the large-system mean secrecy rate R◦ achievable
by RCI precoding in the BCCE.
Theorem 4. The mean secrecy rate achievable for user k by RCI precoding in the BCCE satisfies
|EΦe [Rk]− R◦| a.s.−→ 0, as N →∞, ∀k. (31)
R◦ denotes the mean secrecy rate in the large-system regime, given by
R◦ =


0 if γ◦ ≤ γ◦M
log2
(1+γ◦)1−O
◦
(1+γ◦M)
1−P◦
− ∫ γ◦
γ◦
M
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy otherwise
(32)
In (32), P◦ is the probability that the SINR γE,k at the external eavesdroppers is greater than or equal
to the large-system SINR γ◦M at the malicious users, and for η = 4 it is given by
P◦ , P(γE,k ≥ γ◦M) =


1− exp
(
− µλe√
Nγ◦
M
)
for non-colluding eavesdroppers
1− 2Q
(
µλe
√
π
2Nγ◦
M
)
for colluding eavesdroppers
(33)
Proof: Theorem 4 follows from Lemma 4, by replacing γk and γM,k with their respective deter-
ministic equivalents γ◦ and γ◦M , by applying the continuous mapping theorem, the Markov inequality,
and the Borel-Cantelli lemma [30].
B. Secrecy Rate Loss due to the External Eavesdroppers
By comparing the large-system mean secrecy rate of the BCCE in (32) to the large-system secrecy
rate of the BCC without external eavesdroppers in (7), for a given regularization parameter ξ, we can
evaluate the secrecy rate loss ∆e due to the presence of external eavesdroppers, defined as
∆e , R
◦
BCC − R◦. (34)
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We now obtain an upper bound on the secrecy rate loss ∆e.
Corollary 3. The secrecy rate loss ∆e due to the presence of external eavesdroppers satisfies
∆e ≤ ∆UBe ,
νλe√
N
, (35)
where ν is a constant independent of N , λe, and of the cooperation strategy at the eavesdroppers,
given by
ν = µ
[
R◦BCC√
γ◦
+
(√
γ◦ −√γ◦M)+
]
. (36)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 2. It follows from Corollary 3 that, irrespective of the collusion strategy at the external
eavesdroppers, (i) as the number N of transmit antennas grows, the secrecy rate loss ∆e tends to zero
as 1√
N
, and (ii) increasing the density of eavesdroppers λe by a factor n requires increasing N by a
factor n2 in order to meet a given value of ∆UBe .
C. Optimal Regularization Parameter
The value of the regularization parameter ξ has a significant impact on the secrecy rates. The
optimal large-system regularization parameter of the RCI precoder for the MISO broadcast channel
(BC) without secrecy requirements is given by ξ◦BC = βρ [12], [14], [15]. The optimal large-system
regularization parameter for the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) was
derived in [21] and it is also a function of β and ρ, given by ξ◦BCC in (9). In the MISO broadcast channel
with confidential messages and external eavesdroppers (BCCE), we denote by ξ◦BCCE the regularization
parameter that maximizes the large-system mean secrecy rate. The value of ξ◦BCCE can be obtained by
numerically solving the following equation
ξ◦BCCE , argmax
ξ
R◦ (37)
with R◦ given in (32). Since the secrecy rate of the MISO BCCE is affected by the SINR at the
external eavesdroppers, the optimal large-system regularization parameter ξ◦BCCE is not just a function
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of β and ρ, but it also depends on the number of transmit antennas N , the density of the eavesdroppers
λe, and their collusion strategy. The value of ξ◦BCCE should be found as a compromise between: (i)
maximizing the SINR γ◦ at the legitimate user, and (ii) trading off the SINR γ◦M at the malicious users
and the probability P◦ that the external eavesdroppers are more harmful than the malicious users. We
have the following two extreme cases.
Lemma 5. The optimal large-system regularization parameter ξ◦BCCE follows the trend:
ξ◦BCCE → ξ◦BCC as λe → 0
ξ◦BCCE → ξ◦BC = βρ as λe →∞
(38)
Proof: For low densities λe, we have by Corollary 3 that R◦ approaches R◦BCC, therefore ξ◦BCCE
approaches ξ◦BCC. For high densities λe, we have Pk = P(γE,k ≥ γM,k) → 1, and the secrecy rate Rk
in (11) is determined solely by γk and γE,k. Since γE,k does not depend on ξ, maximizing the mean
rate coincides with the rate maximization problem for the BC, and its solution in the large-system
regime is given by ξ◦BC.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to show the performance of RCI precoding in the BCCE,
under a path loss exponent η = 4. We consider finite-size systems, and simulate the probability of
secrecy outage, the secrecy rate, and the optimal regularization parameter of the precoder, in different
scenarios and under different system dimensions, network loads, SNRs, and densities of eavesdroppers.
The simulations show that many results obtained in Section III and Section IV by using random matrix
theory and stochastic geometry tools hold even for networks with a small number of users and antennas
and randomly located eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 2 we compare the simulated probability of outage Ok under non-colluding and colluding
eavesdroppers, respectively, to the large-system results O◦ provided in Theorem 1 and Theorem 3,
respectively. In the simulations, the regularization parameter ξ◦BCC in (9) was used. We observe that for
17
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Fig. 2. Comparison between the simulated probability of outage Ok and the large-system results O◦ provided in Theorem 1 and
Theorem 3, for a network load β = 1, an SNR ρ = 10dB, and various values of λe.
λe = 0.1 and small probabilities of secrecy outage, (i) N >
(
µλe
0.1
√
γ◦
)2
= 34 yields to a secrecy outage
probability smaller than 0.1, (ii) the secrecy outage probability decays as 1√
N
, and (iii) the collusion
of eavesdroppers does not significantly affect the probability of secrecy outage. All these observations
are consistent with Corollary 1, Corollary 2, and Remark 1.
In Fig. 3 we compare the simulated ergodic per-antenna secrecy sum-rate under non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers, to the large-system results from Theorem 4, for λe = 0.1, N = 10, ξ = ξ◦BCC,
and various values of β. We note that the accuracy of the large-system analysis decreases with the
SNR. The loss of accuracy is due to the limitations of the tools used from RMT [15]. Moreover, we
note that the per-antenna secrecy sum-rate does not monotonically increase with the SNR. This is
due to the fact that in the worst-case scenario the malicious users and the external eavesdroppers can
cancel the interference, whereas the legitimate user is interference-limited in the high-SNR regime.
This is consistent with the case of BCC [21].
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Fig. 3. Comparison between the simulated ergodic per-antenna secrecy sum-rate E[S]/N under non-colluding and colluding
eavesdroppers, and the large-system results KR◦/N from Theorem 4, for λe = 0.1, N = 10 transmit antennas, and various values of
the network load β.
In Fig. 4 we compare the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rate under non-colluding and colluding
eavesdroppers, to the large-system results from Theorem 4, for β = 1, ρ = 10dB, ξ = ξ◦BCC, and various
values of λe. We note that the accuracy of the large-system analysis increases with N . Moreover, we
observe that the expectation of the per-user secrecy rate increases with N , and this benefit is more
for larger values of λe. This happens because the mean received power at each external eavesdropper
scales as 1
βN
, hence having more transmit antennas makes the system more robust against external
eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 5 we compare the simulated per-user secrecy rate of (i) the BCCE with non-colluding
eavesdroppers, (ii) the BCCE with colluding eavesdroppers, and (iii) the BCC without external eaves-
droppers, for β = 1, ρ = 10dB, ξ = ξ◦BCC, and various values of λe. We note that in the BCC, the
per-user secrecy rate is almost constant with N , for a fixed network load β. On the other hand, the per-
user secrecy rate of the BCCE increases with N . Again, this happens because the mean received power
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Fig. 4. Comparison between the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rate E[Rk] under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, and
the large-system results R◦ from Theorem 4, for a network load β = 1, an SNR ρ = 10dB, and various values of λe.
at each external eavesdropper scales as 1
βN
, hence having more transmit antennas makes the system
more robust against external eavesdroppers. We also note that for higher densities of eavesdroppers λe,
larger values of N are required to achieve a given per-user secrecy rate of the BCCE. More precisely,
increasing λe by a factor 2, requires increasing N by a factor 4. Moreover, the collusion of external
eavesdroppers does not affect the scaling law of the mean rate. These observations are consistent with
Remark 2.
Fig. 6 compares the large-system regularization parameter ξ◦BCCE given by (37) to the value ξ¯BCCE
that maximizes the average simulated secrecy sum-rate S, for a finite system with N = 10, β = 1, and
ρ = 10dB. The figure shows that for low densities of eavesdroppers λe, ξ◦BCCE tends to ξ◦BCC = 0.0273,
whereas for high densities λe, it tends to ξ◦BC = 0.1. These observations are consistent with Lemma
5. The finite-system parameter ξ¯BCCE follows a similar trend. We note that both ξ◦BCCE and ξ¯BCCE are
smaller in the case of non-colluding eavesdroppers, and this can be explained as follows. A smaller
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Fig. 5. Comparison between the simulated ergodic per-user secrecy rates of: (i) the BCCE with non-colluding eavesdroppers, (ii) the
BCCE with colluding eavesdroppers, and (iii) the BCC without external eavesdroppers, for a network load β = 1, an SNR ρ = 10dB,
and various values of λe.
value of ξ generates a smaller information leakage to the malicious users. Therefore, it is especially
desirable to have a smaller ξ when the malicious users are the main concern, i.e., when their SINR
is larger than the SINR at the external eavesdroppers, and this is more likely to happen when the
external eavesdroppers are not colluding.
Fig. 7 shows that using the regularization parameter ξ◦BCCE, obtained from large-system analysis,
does not cause a significant loss compared to using the optimal parameter ξ⋆BCCE, optimized for each
realization of the channels and of the locations of the external eavesdroppers. The figure shows the
mean secrecy sum-rate difference S(ξ⋆BCCE) − S(ξ◦BCCE) normalized by the mean optimal S(ξ⋆BCCE),
simulated for finite-size systems, β = 1, various values of the density of eavesdroppers λe, and
various values of the SNR ρ. Fig. 7 was obtained for colluding eavesdroppers, but similar results were
obtained for non-colluding eavesdroppers. We note that calculating the optimal value ξ⋆BCCE requires
the base station to know (i) the channels H of all users, (ii) the realization of the PPP Φe, i.e., the
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Fig. 6. Comparison between the large-system regularization parameter ξ◦BCCE in (37) and the value ξ¯BCCE that maximizes the average
simulated secrecy sum-rate S for a finite system with N = 10 transmit antennas, a network load β = 1, and an SNR ρ = 10dB.
locations of all external eavesdroppers, and (iii) the channels h†e of all external eavesdroppers. On the
other hand, calculating ξ◦BCCE does not require the knowledge of any of these quantities. We observe
that the normalized mean secrecy sum-rate difference is less than 7% for all values of N , λe, and ρ,
and it decreases when N grows, e.g., falling under 3% for N = 20. As a result, one can avoid the
calculation of ξ⋆BCCE for every realization of H, Φe, and h†e, and ξ◦BCCE can be used with only a small
loss of performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the broadcast channel with confidential messages and external eavesdrop-
pers (BCCE), where a multi-antenna base station simultaneously communicates to multiple malicious
users, in the presence of randomly located external eavesdroppers. We showed that, irrespective of the
collusion strategy at the external eavesdroppers, a large number of transmit antennas N drives both the
probability of secrecy outage and the rate loss due to the presence of external eavesdroppers to zero.
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the density of eavesdroppers λe, and various values of the SNR ρ.
Increasing the density of eavesdroppers λe by a factor n, requires n2 as many antennas to meet a given
probability of secrecy outage and a given mean secrecy rate. Using the developed analysis, we clearly
established the importance of the number of transmit antennas at the BS to make communications
robust against malicious users and external eavesdropping nodes. Investigating the secrecy rates in a
cellular scenario, where multiple base stations generate inter-cell interference and malicious users of
neighboring cells can cooperate, could be an interesting future research direction.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1: If γk ≤ γM,k, then Rk in (11) is zero w.p. 1. If γk > γM,k, we have for
non-colluding eavesdroppers γE,k = max
e
γe,k, therefore
Ok = P
(
γE,k ≥ γk
∣∣∣ γk) = 1− EΦe
[∏
x∈Φe
P
(
γx,k < γk
∣∣∣ γk)
]
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= 1− EΦe
[∏
x∈Φe
[
1− P
(
γx,k ≥ γk
∣∣∣ γk)]
]
(a)
= 1− EΦe
[∏
x∈Φe
[
1− exp
(
−Nβσ2γk‖x‖η
)]]
(b)
= 1− exp
[
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
y exp
(
−Nβσ2γk yη
)
dy
]
(c)
= 1− exp
[
−πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Nβσ2γk u
η
2
)
du
]
(d)
= 1− exp
[
− 2πλe
η(Nβσ2γk)
2
η
∫ ∞
0
e−tt
2
η
−1dt
]
(e)
= 1− exp

− 2πλeΓ
(
2
η
)
η(Nβσ2γk)
2
η

 (39)
where (a) follows from the distribution of γe,k, (b) follows by using ‖x‖ = y, by applying the
probability generating functional (PGFL) for the PPP Φe, given by [27]
EΦe
[∏
x∈Φe
f(x)
]
= exp
{
−
∫
R2
[1− f(x)]λedx
}
(40)
and by changing to polar coordinates. Moreover, in (c) we have used u = y2, in (d) we have used
t = Mβσ2γku
η
2 , and (e) follows from the definition of the gamma function
Γ(z) ,
∫ ∞
0
tz−1e−tdt. (41)
APPENDIX B
Proof of Lemma 2: If γk ≤ γM,k, then Rk in (11) is zero with probability one. If γk > γM,k, we
have for the eavesdropper nearest to the BS
Ok = P
(
γE,k ≥ γk
∣∣∣ γk)
=
∫ ∞
0
P
(
γE,k ≥ γk
∣∣∣ γk, ‖E‖ = x)f‖E‖(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
P
(x−η
σ2
∣∣∣h†Ewk∣∣∣2 ≥ γk ∣∣∣ γk, ‖E‖ = x)f‖E‖(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
P
( ∣∣∣h†Ewk∣∣∣2 ≥ σ2γkxη ∣∣∣ γk, ‖E‖ = x)f‖E‖(x)dx
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Nβσ2γkxη
)
f‖E‖(x)dx
(b)
= 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
x exp
(
−Nβσ2γk xη − λeπx2
)
dx, (42)
24
where (a) holds because
∣∣∣h†Ewk∣∣∣2 ∼ exp( 1Nβ ), and (b) holds because the distance ‖E‖ between the
base station and the nearest eavesdropper E has distribution [31]
f‖E‖(x) = 2λeπx exp(−λeπx2). (43)
For a path loss exponent η = 4, (42) reduces to
Ok = 2πλe
∫ ∞
0
x exp
(
−Nβσ2γk x4 − λeπx2
)
dx
(c)
= πλe
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Nβσ2γk u2 − λeπu
)
du
(d)
=
π
3
2λe
2
√
Nβσ2γk
exp
[
(πλe)
2
4Nβσ2γk
]
erfc
(
πλe
2
√
Nβσ2γk
)
(44)
where in (c) we have used u = x2, and (d) follows from∫ ∞
0
exp(−ax2 − bx)dx = 1
2
√
π
a
exp
(
b2
4a
)
erfc
(
b
2
√
a
)
. (45)
APPENDIX C
Proof of Lemma 3: For the case of colluding eavesdroppers, the Laplace transform of the SINR
is [32]
LγE,k(s) = E
[
exp
(
− s
σ2
∑
x∈Φe
‖x‖−η ∣∣h†xwk∣∣2
)]
(a)
= exp
{
−2πλe
∫
R2
Eh
[
1− exp
(
− s
σ2
∣∣h†xwk∣∣2 ‖x‖−η)] x dx
}
(b)
= exp
{
−πλe Eh
[∣∣∣∣ 1σh†xwk
∣∣∣∣
4
η
]
Γ
(
1− 2
η
)
s
2
η
}
(c)
= exp
{
−πλe
(
Nβσ2
)− 2
η Γ
(
1 +
2
η
)
Γ
(
1− 2
η
)
s
2
η
}
(46)
where (a) holds since Φe is a PPP [32], (b) follows since the fading is independent of the point process,
and (c) follows since ∣∣h†xwk∣∣2 ∼ exp( 1Nβ ). Under a path loss exponent η = 4, (46) reduces to
LγE,k(s) = exp
(
−π
2λe
2
√
s
Nβσ2
)
. (47)
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By inverse transform one can obtain the distribution function [33]
fγE,k(y) =
π
3
2λey
− 3
2
4
√
Nβσ2
exp
(
− π
4λ2e
16Nβσ2y
)
, (48)
which integrated yields the cumulative distribution function
FγE,k(y) = erfc
[
π2λe
4
√
Nβσ2y
]
, (49)
from which the secrecy outage probability in (25) can be calculated as Ok = FγE,k(γk).
APPENDIX D
Proof of Lemma 4: We note from (11) that when γk ≤ γM,k, the secrecy rate Rk is zero ∀ γE,k.
When γk > γM,k, the mean secrecy rate is given by
EΦe [Rk|γk>γM,k] = EΦe
[
max
[
log2
(
1 + γk
)
− log2
(
1 + max (γE,k, γM,k)
)
, 0
]]
= EΦe
[[
log2
(
1 + γk
)
− log2
(
1 + max (γE,k, γM,k)
)]
1(γE,k<γk)
]
= EΦe
[
log2
(
1 + γk
)
1(γE,k<γk) − log2
(
1 + max (γE,k, γM,k)
)
1(γE,k<γk)
]
= P (γE,k < γk) log2
(
1 + γk
)
−EΦe
[
log2
(
1+max (γE,k, γM,k)
)
1(γE,k<γk)
]
= P (γE,k < γk) log2
(
1 + γk
)
− EΦe
[
log2
(
1 + γM,k
)
1(γE,k<γM,k) + log2
(
1 + γE,k
)
1(γM,k<γE,k<γk)
]
= P (γE,k < γk) log2
(
1 + γk
)
− P (γE,k < γM,k) log2
(
1 + γM,k
)
−
∫ γk
γM,k
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy
= log2
(
1 + γk
)1−Ok − log2 (1 + γM,k)1−Pk −
∫ γk
γM,k
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy
= log2
(
1 + γk
)1−Ok
(
1 + γM,k
)1−Pk −
∫ γk
γM,k
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy (50)
where (i) 1(·) is the indicator function, (ii) Ok , P (γE,k ≥ γk) is given by the secrecy outage
probability; (iii) Pk , P (γE,k ≥ γM,k) is the probability that the SINR at the external eavesdroppers
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is greater than or equal to the SINR at the malicious users, given in (29) and obtained by calculations
similar to the ones in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2; and (iv) fγE,k(y) is the distribution of the SINR at the
external eavesdroppers, given by (48) for colluding eavesdroppers, and by
fγE,k(y) =
∂P (γE,k < y)
∂y
=
π
3
2λey
− 3
2
4
√
Nβσ2
exp
(
− π
3
2λe
2
√
Nβσ2y
)
(51)
for non-colluding eavesdroppers.
APPENDIX E
Proof of Corollary 3: For γ◦ ≤ γ◦M , we have R◦BCC = 0 and R◦ = 0, therefore ∆e = 0. For
γ◦ > γ◦M and fixed ξ, irrespective of the cooperation strategy at the eavesdroppers, we have
∆e = O◦ log(1 + γ◦)− P◦ log(1 + γ◦M) +
∫ γ◦
γ◦
M
log2(1 + y)fγE,k(y) dy
(a)
≤ O◦R◦BCC +
µλe
2
√
N
∫ γ◦
γ◦
M
y−
1
2 dy
=
[
1− exp
(
− µλe√
Nγ◦
)]
R◦BCC +
µλe√
N
(√
γ◦ −√γ◦M)
≤ µλe√
Nγ◦
R◦BCC +
µλe√
N
(√
γ◦ −√γ◦M) = µ
[
R◦BCC√
γ◦
+
(√
γ◦ −√γ◦M)
]
λe√
N
(52)
where (a) holds because P◦ > O◦, log2(1 + y) ≤ y, and fγE,k(y) ≤ µλey
−
3
2
2
√
N
.
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